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Once More Unto the Breach: An Analysis of Legal, Technological, and Policy Issues Involving
Data Breach Notification Statutes
Dana J. Lesemann

2

Companies facing the loss of a laptop or a compromised server have long waged battles on
several fronts: investigating the source of the breach, identifying potentially criminal behavior, retrieving or
replicating lost or manipulated data, and putting better security in place, to name a few generalized
steps. As recently as seven years ago, the broader consequences of a data breach were largely
deflected from the party on whose resource the data resided and instead rested essentially on those
whose data was compromised. Today, however, with the patchwork quilt of domestic data breach
statutes and penalties, most companies forging “unto the breach” would consider paying a ransom worthy
of King Henry to avoid the loss of its consumers’ identities through theft or manipulation.

The rise in the incidences of these breaches is well documented. Reports of data breaches
increased dramatically in 2008. The Identity Theft Resource Center reported 656 breaches in 2008,
3

reflecting an increase of 47% over the previous year’s total of 446. A single vendor, Verizon, recently
issued a report that analyzed 90 confirmed data breaches within its 2008 caseload, which encompassed
4

285 million compromised records.

In confronting a data breach, a company has to contend with a multitude of issues: the costs of
replacing lost equipment, repairing the breach and thwarting a potentially criminal act. Some specific
industries have their own privacy laws. For example, financial firms must contend with the reporting

1

William Shakespeare, Henry V, Act III.

2

Managing Director and Deputy General Counsel, Stroz Friedberg and Adjunct Professor of Law, Howard
University School of Law. Stroz Friedberg is a consulting and technical services firm specializing in digital forensics,
network intrusion, data breach response, and cyber-security investigations. I am grateful to my colleagues at Stroz
Friedberg for their assistance in developing this article, particularly the research of Steven Mecca and the expert
editorial review of Miriam Birnbaum, Thomas Harris-Warrick, and Paul Luehr. Thanks also to Ahmed Baset, Howard
University School of Law, Class of 2010. All errors, of course, remain my own.
3
Identity Theft Resource Center, Report on Data Breaches 2008,
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/publish/lib_survey/Breaches_2008.shtml
4
Verizon 2009 Data Breach Investigations Report,
http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/security/reports/2009_databreach_rp.pdf, at 32.
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5

requirements associated with the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and health care companies face
6

broad reporting requirements under the new HITECH Act. Across the broader economy, however,
attorneys and companies worry most about a thicket of data breach notification statutes enacted by 45
states and the District of Columbia. These statutes expose law firms and their clients to conflicting time
limits, reporting requirements, fines, and potentially millions of dollars in penalties and civil liability -- not to
mention reputational risk. The 46 data breach notification statutes vary widely from state to state and,
most critically, focus not on the location of the breach or where the company is incorporated but on the
7

residence of the victim. Therefore, a company facing a data breach must comply with the state laws of
each of its affected consumers. A company’s multi-state or Internet presence only extends the potential
web of specific time limits and other often conflicting requirements for notifying consumers.

This Article addresses the legal, technological, and policy issues surrounding U.S. data breach
notification statutes and recommends steps that state and federal regulatory agencies should take to
improve and harmonize those statutes. Part I of this Article provides background on the data breaches
that gave rise to the enactment of notification statutes. Part II addresses the varying definitions of
“personal information” in the state statutes – the data that is protected by the statute and whose breach
must be revealed to consumers. Part III analyzes how states define the data breach itself, particularly
whether states rely on a strict liability standard, on a risk assessment approach, or on a model that blends
elements of both in determining how and when companies have to notify consumers of a breach. Part IV
discusses the time limits companies face, penalties for non-compliance, litigation under the statutes, and
enforcement of the statutes by states. Finally, Part V presents specific recommendations for the state
legislatures and enforcement agencies and for Congress, as well as for companies facing data breaches.

5
6
7

15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq.
HITECH Act at §13402, codified at 42 U.S.C. §17932.
See infra at Part I.
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I.

Background

8

Data breach statute fever began in 2002 after a California state database, which contained the
social security numbers and other personal information of more than 250,000 state employees, was
compromised. The breach was not discovered for a month and affected employees were not notified for
9

several weeks after that. This breach – and the way it was handled -- led the California legislature to
enact the country’s first data breach notification statute later that year.

10

In February 2005, ChoicePoint,

a commercial data broker, announced that it had unwittingly sold personal information regarding 145,000
11

individuals to a group of people engaged in identity theft.

The company later said the breach had

actually occurred and been uncovered in September 2004, five months before ChoicePoint had alerted
the victims in California pursuant to the California statute. Then, significantly, victims in other states were
not notified, since no legal mandate required notification. This strict compliance with the letter of the law
became a public relations nightmare for ChoicePoint when non-California victims found out they had been
omitted from the notice.

The Federal Trade Commission subsequently sued ChoicePoint for not having reasonable
procedures to screen prospective subscribers, for turning over consumers’ sensitive personal information
to subscribers whose applications raised obvious “red flags”, and for making false or misleading
12

statements about its privacy practices.

In 2006 ChoicePoint agreed to pay the FTC $10 million in civil

penalties – a record amount – and agreed to make $5 million available to consumers in restitution.

8

13

The

The Privacy Law Blog maintained by Proskauer Rose LLP contains links to most of the statues cited here.
See http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2007/08/articles/security-breach-notification-l/breach-law-data/#more. Although
Oklahoma enacted a data breach notification statute in 2006, its provisions apply only to state agencies, boards,
commissions or other units or subdivisions of the state government. See O.S. § 3113.1. Because of the limited
applicability of Oklahoma’s data breach statute, this article omits any discussion of its substantive provisions.
9
See, e.g., Anthony D. Milewski Jr., 2 Shidler J. L. Com. & Tech. 19 (Apr. 14, 2006), at
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol2/a019Milewski.html and sources cited within.
10
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.80 et seq. See also Milewski, supra.
11
12

See http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069complaint.pdf

13

http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069stip.pdf,
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm
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following year the company settled with 44 state attorneys general to resolve allegations that ChoicePoint
had failed to adequately maintain the privacy and security of consumers' personal information.
A flood of disclosures similar to ChoicePoint’s soon followed
data breach notification statues.
2008,

19

16

15

and in 2005 ten states enacted

Seventeen states followed suit in 2006,

and three thus far in 2009,

20

14

17

another nine in 2007,

18

five in

bringing the total number of states enacting data breach notification

laws to 46.

After ChoicePoint, each data breach notification statute passed by a state was designed to
provide specific protection to that state’s residents. California’s statute, for example, provides that “[i]t is
the intent of the legislature to ensure that personal information about California residents is protected.”

21

Similarly, the statute’s disclosure requirements are focused on California residents:
(a) Any person or business that conducts business in California, and that owns or licenses computerized
data that includes personal information, shall disclose any breach of the security of the system following
discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to any resident of California whose
unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an
22
unauthorized person.
The other 45 statutes also have focused on their own residents in enacting statutes that have varied
requirements for investigating and disclosing data breaches, some with significant monetary penalties.

23

14

See http://www.naag.org/44_attorneys_general_reach_settlement_with_choicepoint.php The 44 states that
participated in the settlement are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, H a wa i i , I d a h o , I l l i n o i s , I n d i a n a , I o w a , K e n t u c k y, L o u i s i a n a , M a i n e , Ma r yl a n d ,
M a s s a c h u s e t ts , M i c h i g a n , Mi n n e s o ta , M i s s i s s i p p i , Mi s s o u r i , Mo n ta n a , N e b r a s k a , N e va d a , N e w
J e r s e y, N e w M e x i c o , N e w Yo r k , N o r t h C a r o l i n a , N o r t h D a k o ta , O h i o , O k l a h o m a , O r e g o n ,
P e n n s y l v a n i a , S o u t h D a k o ta , Te n n e s s e e , Te xa s , Ve r m o n t , Vi r g i n i a , W a s h in g t o n , W es t Vi r g i n i a ,
W is c o n s i n a n d t h e D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a .
15
See “A Chronology of Data Breaches,” http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm
16

The 10 states to enact data breach notification statutes in 2005 were Arkansas, Georgia, North Dakota,
Delaware, Florida, Tennessee, Washington, Texas, North Carolina, and New York.
17
The 17 states that enacted statutes in 2006 are Connecticut, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada, new jersey,
Maine, Ohio, Montana, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Idaho, Indiana, Nebraska, Colorado, Arizona.
18
In 2007 Hawaii, Kansas, New Hampshire, Utah, Vermont, Michigan, District of Columbia, Wyoming, Oregon
enacted data breach notification statutes.
19
Maryland, Massachusetts, West Virginia, Iowa, and Virginia enacted new data breach notification statutes
and Oklahoma passed a substantial revision to its statute.
20
Alaska, Missouri, and South Carolina have passed data breach notification statutes thus far in 2009.
21
22

Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5.
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(a).

23

See Alaska, Alaska Stat. § 45.48.010; Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-7501(L)(4); Arkansas, § 4-110105(a)(1); Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-716 (d)(I); Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. § Sec. 36a-701b(b);
Delaware, Del. Code Ann. Tit. 6, 12B-102 (a); District of Columbia, D.C. Code § 28-3852(a); Florida, Fla. Stat. §

4
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Thus, under these statutes, it is the resident of the victim – and not the location of the company or the
breach – that controls the notification requirements. As a result, a company facing a data breach in which
the victims are spread across the country – a near certainty today, especially with the Internet providing
virtual locations across the globe – could face multiple, inconsistent requirements and harsh penalties for
failing to comply.

II. Personal Information Defined
A. The California Model
Most states have modeled their data breach statutes after California’s 2002 groundbreaking law.
California’s statute requires notification to individuals if, as the result of a breach in a company’s computer
24

security, an individual’s “personal information” is compromised.

California’s initial statute defined

“personal information” as a person’s first name or first initial and his or her last name in combination with
any one or more of the following pieces of data, when either the name or the data elements are not
encrypted or redacted:

•

Social Security Number

•

Driver’s license number or state identification card number

•

Account number, credit, or debit card number, in combination with any required security
code, access code, or password that would permit access to an individual’s financial
account.

25

In 2007 California added two additional elements to the definition of personal information:

817.5681(1)(a); Georgia, Ga. Code. Ann. § 10-1-912; Hawaii, H.R.S. § 487N-2(a); Idaho, Idaho Code § 28-51-104(5),
28-51-105; Illinois, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 530/10; Indiana, Ind. Code § 24-4.9-3-1; Iowa, § 715C.1-2; Kansas, Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 50-7a02(a); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51: 3074(a); Maryland, Md. Code Ann. §14-3502(A); Massachusetts,
Mass. Gen. Laws 93H § 3; Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws. § 445.72; Minnesota, Minn. Stat. § 325E.61, Subdiv. 1;
Missouri, 407.1500. 2; Montana, Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-1704 (1); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-803; Nevada,
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 603A.220; New Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-C:19 (V); New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. 56:8163(12)(a); New York, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 899-aa.2; North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. §75-65; North Dakota, N.D.
Cent. Code § 51-30-02; Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.19(A)(1)(a); Oklahoma, 2008 H.B. 2245(a); Oregon, Or.
Rev. Stat. Section 2(2); Pennsylvania, 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. Section 2; Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws, § 11-49.2-3; South
Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 39-1-90; Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. 47-18-2107(b); Texas, Tex. Bus & Com. Code
Ann. § 48.103(b); Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 13-44-202(1)(a); Vermont, 9 V.S.A. § 2430(2); Virginia, S.B. 307; Wash.
Rev. Code § 19.255.010(1); West Virginia, W. Va. Code §46A-2A-101(6); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. § 895.507; Wyoming,
Wyo. Stat. Ann. 40-12-501 (a)(1).
24
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(e),
25

Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(e).

5
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•

Medical information

•

Health insurance information.

26

These amendments became effective January 1, 2008. In California, as in all except three states with
data breach notification statutes, “personal information” is defined to exclude information that is publicly
available.

27

B. Other State Variations
Some states include additional elements in the definition of “personal information” beyond the
California model. For example, the Iowa,

28

Nebraska,

29

30

and Wisconsin data breach notification statutes

include unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, retina, or iris images in the definition. North Carolina

31

32

and North Dakota expand on the California model to include an employee’s digital signatures.

New York takes a different approach. The statute simply -- and sweepingly -- defines personal
information as “any information concerning a natural person which, because of name, number, symbol,
mark or other identifier, can be used to identify that natural person,” plus the individual’s social security
number, driver’s license number (or non-driver identification card number), account number, credit or
debit card number, PIN, or other necessary code.

33

(emphasis added)
34

It is also worth noting that the data breach statutes in Alaska, Hawaii,
Carolina,

37

Massachusetts,

38

and Wisconsin

39

35

Indiana,

36

North

include a breach of written as well as electronic data within

the scope of their laws.

26

California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, A.B. 1298.

27

The three states that do not exclude publicly available information from the definition of personal information
are Michigan, Montana and Rhode Island.
28
Iowa Code § 715C.1(11).
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-802(5).
Wis. Stat. § 895.507(5).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-65.
N.D. Cent. Code § 51-30-01(2)(a).
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law. §899-aa(1)(a)-(b).
Alaska Stat § 45.48.090(1).
H.R.S. § 487N-1.

6
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III. Defining a Data Breach

The 46 statutes define a “data breach” on a continuum from a strict liability standard to a risk40

based approach. Some states define a breach simply as the “compromise” of a system, whereas others
incorporate into the definition the extent to which the data is likely to be misused and, in some cases, the
41

likelihood that the misuse will lead to injury of the consumers.

In some cases the definitions incorporate

a requirement that the companies investigate where the risk of harm is unknown.

Some statutes require that companies notify consumers based solely on “unauthorized access” to
consumers’ personal information or “compromise” of personal information, whether or not the access to or
compromise of that information results in fraud, crime, or any injury to the consumer. Because of the lack
of demonstrated risk, injury, or possibility of injury, this can be referred to as a form of “strict liability”
notification. At the other end of the scale is the risk assessment model, in which notice is required if the
unauthorized acquisition creates a risk of harm to the consumer.

A. The Strict Liability Model

Under the strict liability model, companies are not required to perform a risk assessment and
must provide notice whether or not there has been an actual injury to consumers. Typically, the language
found in this type of data breach notification statute is a requirement that companies must notify
consumers on the basis of unauthorized access to or the compromise of personal information. North
Dakota defines a security breach in the broadest possible terms, as the “unauthorized access to” or

36
37
38

Ind. Code § 24-4.9-2-2 (2)(a).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-65(a).
Mass. Gen. Laws., § 93H 1(a).

39

See Wis. Stat. § 895.507(b). In fact, Wisconsin’s data breach statute never mention electronic data or
computer systems, but requires an organization to notify all consumers – not merely Wisconsin residents – if it
becomes aware that that someone has acquired personal information without authorization to do so. See Wis. Stat. §
895 507(2).
40
See discussion infra at Section III.A
41

See discussion infra at Section III.B.

7
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“acquisition of” computerized data; notification is required whether or not the unauthorized access or
acquisition of computerized data results in the compromise of personal information.

42

California’s data breach notification statute defines a breach of the security system as an
“unauthorized acquisition” of data that “compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal
information.”

43

This type of statute requires notification in nearly all cases where unencrypted sensitive

personal data is reasonably believed to have been acquired, whether or not there is any injury to the
44

consumer.

Eight states—Delaware,

and Washington,

52

45

Georgia,

46

Illinois,

-- as well as the District of Columbia

Six of these states—Arizona,

54

Florida,

55

47

Minnesota,

48

North Dakota,

49

53

follow this strict liability model.

56

Nevada,

Idaho,

57

Oregon,

58

50

Texas, Utah,

51

59

and Tennessee —

incorporate an element of “materiality” into the definition of a “breach of the security system.” Florida, for
example, defines a data breach as an “unauthorized acquisition” of data that “materially compromises the

42

N.D. Cent. Code § 51-30-01 (1).

43

Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(d). A standard provision found in the California Code and in the other data
breach notification statutes is an exemption for the good faith acquisition of personal information by an employee or
agent of the person, which is considered not to be a breach of the security of the system, provided the information is
not used for a purpose unrelated to the business or subject to further unauthorized use. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code. §
1798.82(d).
44
See GAO Report to Congressional Requestors, Personal Information: Data Breaches Are Frequent, but
Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft is Limited; However, the Full Extent is Unknown, GAO-07-737 (June 2007), at
37.
45
Del. Code Ann. Tit 6, § 12B-101(a).
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

See Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-911(1).
See 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 530/5.
See Minn. Stat. § 325E.61, Subdiv. 1(d).
See N.D. Cent. Code § 51-30-02.
See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 48.103.
See Utah Code Ann. § 13-44-102(1)(a).
See Wash. Rev. Code § 19.255.010(4).
See D.C. Code § 28-3851(1).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-7501
Fla. Stat. § 817.5681(4).
Idaho Code § 28-51-104(2).
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 603A.020.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 646A. 602(1)(a).
Tenn. Code. Ann. 47-18-2107(b).

8
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security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information.”

60

(emphasis added) None of these states,

however, defines a “material breach” or otherwise provides clarity as to what constitutes a breach that
“materially compromises” personal information. Moreover, the relative gravity or “materiality” of a breach
is not a function of the number of records or individuals whose personal information is compromised or
whether any actual injury has occurred, but rather whether any compromised record contains personally
identifiable information (PII). Thus, a breach of a system that contains “personal information” appears to
be a prima facie occurrence of a “material” breach.

61

For example, if an ex-boyfriend who hacks into a

computer system and targets the personal information of only one person -- his former girlfriend, he has
effected a “material breach” of that system. As a result, although these statutes might initially appear to
constitute a more relaxed standard, they too create a form of strict liability for companies facing a data
breach.

Two of these states -- Arizona

62

and Idaho

63

-- also require companies to undertake a reasonable

investigation to determine whether there has been a security breach. However, neither statute provides
detail on what steps satisfy the requirements for a “reasonable” investigation.

B. The Risk Assessment Model

In contrast to those states that require companies to notify consumers on the basis of
unauthorized access or the compromise of personal information, ___ states require companies to provide
notice only if the unauthorized acquisition creates a risk of harm to the consumer. The states that have
adopted this risk assessment model have done so using different approaches.

64

Six of these states -- Kansas, Maine,

60

65

66

67

Nebraska, New Hampshire, Utah,

68

and Wyoming

69

--

Fla. Stat. § 817.5681(4) (emphasis added).

61

See Eric Friedberg and Michael McGowan, “Lost Back-Up Tapes, Stolen Laptops and Other Tales of Data
Breach Woe,” The Computer & Internet Lawyer (Oct. 2006).
62
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-7501.
63
64
65

Idaho Code §§ 28-51-105.
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 70-7102.
10 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1348.

9
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also require companies to determine whether there has been a misuse of individuals’ information.

As

with Idaho and Arizona, these statues do not provide detail on what steps satisfy the requirements for a
“reasonable” investigation. New Hampshire, for example, requires an entity to “immediately determine”
whether or not misuse of individuals’ personal information has occurred. These statutes do not indicate
whether notice needs to be given if there is no indication that there has been financial injury.
Nevertheless, companies should be ready to demonstrate their reasonableness by documenting the
steps they take, the relevant expertise of the personnel performing the investigation, and adequately and
thoroughly report the relevant findings to appropriate senior management and/or government agencies.
In short, a company that investigates whether a data breach has or will lead to consumer injury needs to
be ready to “show its work” and report what it did to make that assessment.

Another group of states provides that if a business undertakes an “appropriate” investigation or
consults with relevant federal, state, and local law enforcement, and “reasonably” determines that the
breach has not — and likely will not — result in harm to the individuals whose personal information has
been acquired and accessed, it need not notify those individuals. These types of provisions are found in
70

71

the data breach statutes of Alaska, Arkansas, Florida,

72

Iowa,

73

Rhode Island,

74

75

and Vermont.

These states require businesses to document their findings in writing and maintain the documentation for
a stated number of years. In Florida, for example, companies face a fine of up to $50,000 for failure to
create and maintain proper documentation should they choose not to provide notice following a breach.

76

Although companies in these ten states are not required to conduct an investigation, the laws encourage
them to do so. The statutes also provide incentives for companies to notify federal, state, and local law
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-803(1).
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-C:20 I(a).
Utah Code Ann. §§13-44-102 b, 202.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. 40-12-501(a).
Alaska Stat. §45.48.010(c).
Ark. Code Ann. § 1167, § 4-110-105(d).
Fla. Stat. § 5681(10)(a)
Iowa Code § 715C.1(6).
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-49.2-4.
V.S.A. § 435(d)(1).
Fla. Stat. § 817.5681(10)(a) – (b).

10
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enforcement of the breach, providing investigators and prosecutors with the opportunity to assess the
nature and extent of the compromise and focus their limited resources on the investigations that are the
highest priority.

Fifteen states -- Hawaii,
North Carolina,

84

Ohio,

85

77

Iowa,

78

Indiana,

86

79

Kansas,

Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,

87

80

Massachusetts,

South Carolina,

88

81

Montana,

82

83

New York,

89

Virginia, West Virginia

90

and --

define a “security breach” in terms of whether it leads to a risk of injury to the consumer. Although these
statutes do not explicitly require a company to conduct an investigation into a breach, such a
determination probably requires such a review. Massachusetts, for example, defines “breach of the
security system” as:
the unauthorized acquisition or unauthorized use of unencrypted data or, encrypted electronic
data and the confidential process or key that is capable of compromising the security,
confidentiality, or integrity of personal information, maintained by a person or agency that creates
91
a substantial risk of identity theft or fraud against a resident of the commonwealth.
New York alone lists specific factors that an organization may consider in determining whether
consumers’ personal information has been acquired or is reasonably believed to have been acquired by
an unauthorized individual, including indications (1) that the information is in the physical possession and
control of an unauthorized person, such as a lost or stolen computer or other device; (2) that the
information has been downloaded or copied; or (3) that the information was used by an unauthorized
92

person, such as fraudulent accounts opened or instances of identity theft. Michigan notes simply that
“[i]n determining whether a security breach is not likely to cause substantial loss or injury to, or result in
identity theft,” a person or agency shall act with the care an ordinarily prudent person or agency in like
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

H.R.S. § 487N -1.
Iowa Code § 715C.1(6).
Ind. Code § 24-4.9-2-2.
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-7°01-02
Mass. Gen. Laws 93H§ 1(G).
Mont. Code. Ann. § 30-14-1704(4)(a).
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law, § 899-aa(c).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-61(14).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.19(A).
74 Okla. Stat. 3113.3.
73 Pa. Stat. Ann., § 2302(a).
S.C. Code Ann. § 37-20-110(15).
Va. Code 18.2.-186.6(A).
W. Va. Code § 46A-2A-101(1).
Mass. Gen. Laws 93H§ 1(G).
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law, § 899-aa(c).

11
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93

position would exercise under similar circumstances.

C. Blending Definitions: Risk Assessment and Strict Liability
Some state data breach notification statutes incorporate both risk assessment and strict liability
clauses. These statutes generally start with the premise that a company must disclose a breach. They
then typically incorporate a clawback provision stating that notification will not be required if the company
undertakes an “appropriate investigation,” consults with federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies, and determines that the breach likely will not result in harm to the individuals whose personal
information has been acquired and accessed. Connecticut’s statute is typical:
Any person . . . shall disclose any breach of security following the discovery of the breach to any
resident of this state whose personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been,
accessed by an unauthorized person through such breach of security.
...
Such notification shall not be required if, after an appropriate investigation and consultation with
relevant federal, state and local agencies responsible for law enforcement, the person reasonably
determines that the breach will not likely result in harm to the individuals whose personal
94
information has been acquired and accessed.
There are similar provisions in the data breach notification statutes of Colorado,
Missouri,

98

New Jersey,

99

Oregon,

100

95

Maryland,

96

Michigan,

97

101

and Vermont,

In a few states, a blend of definitions has created internal contradictions. North Carolina defines a
security breach both as “unauthorized access to and acquisition of unencrypted and unredacted records
or data containing personal information where illegal use of the personal information has occurred or is
reasonably likely to occur or that creates a material risk of harm to a consumer.” The statute then adds:
“Any incident of unauthorized access to and acquisition of encrypted records or data containing personal

93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Mich. Comp. Laws. § 445.72(12).
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36a-701(b).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-716.
Md. Code Ann. § 14-3504(B)(3).
Mich. Comp. Laws. § 445.72(12)(1).
Mo. H.B. No. 62, § 407.1500.2(5).
N.J. Stat. Ann. § C.56:8-163.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 646A.602.
V.S.A. § 435(d)(1).
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information along with the confidential process or key shall constitute a security breach.” These two
standards are in conflict. The first clause includes a risk-based analysis into whether there has been
actual illegal use of data or some other “material risk of harm.” The second clause imposes strict liability
for a mere “incident of unauthorized access” to personal information, regardless of whether there is a risk
102

of injury to consumers.

Similarly, Massachusetts’ data breach statute incorporates two different standards, the first of
which is risk-based and the second of which creates a strict liability standard. First, the statute requires
an organization to notify the Commonwealth’s residents if it knows or has reason to know of a breach of
security. A breach is defined as “the unauthorized acquisition or unauthorized use of unencrypted data,
or encrypted electronic data and the confidential process or key that is capable of compromising the
security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information that creates a substantial risk of identity theft
or fraud against a resident of the Commonwealth”.

103

In addition, however, a company must also provide

notice if it knows or has reason to know that the personal information of such a resident was acquired or
used by an unauthorized person or used for an unauthorized person.

104

D. Conducting the Investigation
California’s landmark statute, enacted in the wake of data breaches in 2002, requires companies
to notify consumers “in the most expedient time possible and without unnecessary delay, consistent with
the needs of law enforcement . . . or any measures to determine the scope of the breach and restore the
105

reasonable integrity of the data system.”

The states that followed California in enacting data breach

notification statutes encouraged or required companies, in various ways, to investigate data breaches.
As discussed above, some states encouraged companies to conduct an “appropriate investigation” and
consult with law enforcement, incorporating a provision that notification would not be required if the
investigation resulted in a determination that consumers had not been injured.

106

Other state statutes

included requirements that companies undertake their own investigations and report their findings to law
102
103
104
105
106

N. C. Gen. Stat. § 75-61(14).
Mass. Gen. Laws 93H § 3(a).
Mass. Gen. Laws 93H § 3(a).
Calif. Civ. Code. § 1798.82(a).
See supra III.C.
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enforcement or a regulatory authority.

107

The focus of the investigation varies depending on whether there is a strict liability to report or a
need to report based on a finding of substantial risk. In strict liability states like North Dakota the
investigation focuses on whether consumer’s personal information has simply been acquired and
108

accessed.

In states that focus on substantial risk of injury like Massachusetts,

109

the focus of the

investigation is on whether the consumers had been injured by fraud or identity theft.

No statute actually defines the scope of an “adequate investigation”, details what steps a
company must take, or prescribes how a company should document the results of its investigation.
However, there are a number of questions a company should be able to answer in order to determine
what data was exposed and who was involved in the data breach:
•

Where was the compromised stolen information stored?

•

How was this information accessed, when, and by whom?

•

What did the perpetrators do with the data? Did they extract it? If so, how and what did
they do with it?

•

With whom did the perpetrators communicate about the stolen data, both within and
outside the organization?

110

A digital forensic examiner can take the necessary steps to preserve the evidence in a
forensically sound manner to ensure that nothing crucial to the investigation is altered or obliterated.
Something as simple as changing the “last accessed” dates on the compromised computer system may
make it impossible to ascertain whether an intruder gained unauthorized access to the data at issue.
Even if evidence of illegal activity is found, failures to handle digital evidence in a forensically sound
manner can prevent an organization from taking legal action against the culprit or making a successful

107

See supra III.B.
N.D. Cent. Code §§ 51-30-02.
109
Mass. Gen. Laws 93H § 1(G).
110
See Eoghan Casey, “Data Theft: An Ounce of Forensic Preparedness is Worth a Pound of Incident Response,”
ISSA Journal (Aug. 2007).
108
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criminal referral to law enforcement.

On a practical level, there could be a real or perceived threat to the jobs of the local IT staff,
which creates a potential conflict of interest and an incentive not to disclose all of the circumstances
surrounding the breach. Often an internal IT group may be hesitant to admit that a breach was caused by
an internal security weakness because they fear that any blame for the vulnerability leading to the breach
will be placed at their feet. In fact, IT personnel may even be concerned that they could be viewed as
complicit suspects in the data compromise. For example, if a company discovers that customer sales
data may have been copied illicitly from a shared file server, members of the IT department might be
reluctant to conduct a thorough investigation if they fear being held responsible for failing to secure the
file server, or if they fear that they will be viewed as suspects because they are among the few individuals
who have administrative rights to the file server.

In short, independent digital forensic examiners can be an important part of the successful
investigation of a data breach. When confronting the issue of how to conduct an “appropriate”
investigation and prepare documentation that supports any resulting findings, a company would be wise
to consider the services of digital forensic examiners, much as they would consider the services of
outside counsel well-versed in privacy and data breach law.

E. Safe Harbor under Federal Banking Statutes and Other Laws
Most of the state data breach statutes provide exemptions for firms already governed by the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 or, alternatively, for procedures that are enacted pursuant to
other state or federal rules or regulations.

111

These exemptions arise from the fact that these other

111

See Alaska, Alaska Stat. § 45.48.040(c); Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-7501(J)(1); Arkansas, Ark. Rev.
Stat. § 4-110-106(a); California, Cal. Civ. Code § 4-110-106(5); Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-716(2); Connecticut,
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36a-701(f); Delaware, Del. Code. Ann. Tit. 6, § 12B-103(b); D.C., D.C. Code § 28-3852(g);
Florida, Fla. Stat. § 817.5681(9)(b); Hawaii, H.R.S. § 487N-2(g); Idaho, Idaho Code § 28-51-106(2); Indiana, Indiana
Code § 24-4.9-3-3.5; Iowa, Iowa Code § 715C.2(7)(C); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-7a02(e); Maine, 10 Me. Rev.
Stat. §1349(4); Maryland, Md. Code Ann. Code Ann. §14–3507(c); Mass. Gen. Laws 93H § 5; Michigan, Mich. Comp.
Laws, §445.72(8)(b); Minnesota, Minn, Stat. § 325E.61, Subdiv. 4; Missouri, H.B 62 § 407.1500. 3; Montana, Mont.
Code Ann. § 30-14-1702(8)(b); Nebraska, Neb. Rev Stat. §87-804; Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 603A.040(5)(a); New
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statutes have their own reporting requirements and privacy protections. For example, Congress enacted
the GLBA to ensure that financial service providers would protect consumers' personal financial
information. Under the Act, financial institutions must develop and implement data security policies that
“prevent the unauthorized disclosure of customer financial information and to deter and detect fraudulent
access to such information.” Under the guidance issued pursuant to the GLBA, a financial institution that
becomes aware of unauthorized access to personal information should conduct a reasonable
investigation promptly to determine the likelihood that the information has been or will be misused. If the
company determines that misuse of the information has occurred or is reasonably possible, it is supposed
to notify affected consumers as soon as possible.

112

F. Recommendation: States Should Adopt the Risk Assessment Model which Presents
Greater Benefits for the Consumer over the Strict Liability Approach

A strict liability regime sets a hair trigger for data breach notification. Companies send out letters
to consumers even when there is no evidence of injury, risk of injury, or possibility of injury, but merely
when there is evidence that “access to” consumers’ PII occurred. As a result, consumers receive so
many data breach notification letters that they become numb to the effect.

113

The form letters sent to

consumers generally provide them with no information about actual injury or risk, nor do they provide
consumers with the ability to judge whether there is any likelihood of injury or risk.

Adopting a risk assessment model is a more efficient approach. States and the federal
government should exempt companies from the obligation to notify individuals of a data breach if the
companies (1) undertake an appropriate investigation and “reasonably” determine that the breach has
Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-C:19(V); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-65(h); North Dakota, N.D. Cent.
Code § 51-30-06; Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1349.19(F)(1); Oklahoma, 74 Okla. Stat. § 3113.1; Oregon, Or. Rev.
Stat. § 646A.602(8)(c); Pennsylvania, 73 Pa. Stat. Annot. § 7307(b); Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws, § 11-49.2-7;
South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 39-1-90(J); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-2107(i); Utah, Utah Code Ann.
§13-44-202(5)(c); Vermont, 9 V.S.A. §2435(f); Virginia, Virginia Code Ann. § 18.2-186.6(A); West Virginia, W. Va.
Code §46A-2A-102(f); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. §134.98(3m); Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. Ann § 40-12-502(c).
112
See 12 C.F.R. Pt. 30, App. B., Supp. A. III(A); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 208, App. D-2, Supp. A. § III(A); 12 C.F.R. Pt.
225, App. F, Supp. A § III(a); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 364, App. B, Supp. A, § III(A); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 570, App. B, Supp. § IIII(A);
and 12 C.F.R. Pt. 748, App. B § III(A). See also “Personal Information: Data Breaches Are Frequent, But Evidence of
Resulting Identity Theft is Limited; However, the Full Extent is Unknown, GAO Report to Congressional Requesters,”
GAO-07-737 (June 2007).
113
See Schwartz and Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 913 Mich. L. Rev. 916 (2007) (arguing for
determination of data security breaches and post-notification remediation by an independent third party).
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not—and likely will not—result in harm to the individuals whose PII has been acquired and accessed,
document those results, and maintain them for at least five years; and (2) consult with relevant federal,
state, or local law enforcement regarding their determination that the breach has not—and likely will not—
result in harm to the individuals whose PII has been acquired and accessed. Requiring companies to
undertake a thorough investigation will protect consumers; directing them to liaise with law enforcement
regarding a breach would provide investigators with the information they need and allow for increased
coordination of efforts. The proposal would require federal, state and local law enforcement to share
information they receive from companies that had suffered data breaches; the risk is that government
agencies would find themselves so inundated with information they would be unable to separate the
wheat from the chaff.

IV. When Time Limits Are Not Really Time Limits
Several states have enacted what appear to be stringent time limits on notification of data
breaches to consumers. In reality, these purported time limits have several elements that toll or, in some
cases nullify, the requirements written into these statutes. For example, Florida’s data breach notification
statute states that, absent an investigation or the involvement of law enforcement and the reasonable
determination of no harm, Florida organizations suffering a material breach must notify the affected
individuals in writing, by email or through substituted notice

114

“without unreasonable delay, consistent

with the legitimate needs of law enforcement . . . or subject to any measures necessary to determine the
presence, nature and scope of the breach and restore the reasonable integrity of the system. Notification
must be made no later than 45 days following the determination of the breach unless otherwise provided
in this section.”

115

(emphasis added)

The statute appears to require quick action based on two complementary guidelines regarding
when notice must be issued. Specifically, the notice must be made “without unreasonable delay” but, in
any event, not later than 45-days after there is a “determination of a breach.”

114
115
116

Fla. Stat. § 817.5681(6).
Fla. Stat. § 817.5681(1)(a).
Id.
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In fact, the 45-day
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countdown to provide notice is subject to either tolling or nullification under several circumstances. First,
the 45-day countdown is tolled when the victimized company begins taking “measures necessary to
determine the presence, nature, and scope of the breach and restore the reasonable integrity of the
117

system.”

These measures may take a substantial period of time and no outside time limit is specified in

the statute. Second, the 45-day countdown for notice is nullified and no notification is required under
Florida law if, after a reasonable investigation, the company determines that the breach has not and will
not likely result in harm to the individuals whose personal information has been acquired and accessed.

Only the data breach statutes in Ohio

119

120

and Wisconsin

118

replicate the 45-day limits found in

Florida’s data breach statute. Ohio’s statute makes the rigorous time constraints “subject to the legitimate
needs of law enforcement, and consistent with any measures necessary to determine the scope of the
breach, including which residents’ personal information was accessed and acquired, and to restore the
121

reasonable integrity of the data system.”

(emphasis added) However, the conjunctive between these

two clauses means that companies in Ohio need to coordinate with law enforcement from the onset of the
investigation of a data breach to ensure that the 45-day notification requirement is tolled. Wisconsin’s
statute, in contrast, posits that the only law enforcement exceptions to the 45-day rule must be related to
the protection of an investigation or to homeland security.

122

Another group of 30 states require a company to provide notice in the “most expedient time
possible,” “without unreasonable delay” or “as soon as possible.”

117
118
119
120
121
122

123

In the seven states that require

Id.
See Fla. Stat. § 817.5681(10)(a).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.9(B)(2) (emphasis added)
Wis. Stat. § 895. 507(3).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.9(B)(2).
Wis. Stat. § 895.507(3).

123

The 30 states that require a company to provide notice in the “most expedient time possible” and “without
unreasonable delay” or “as soon as possible” are Alaska, see Alaska Stat. § 45.48.010; Arkansas, see Ark. Code
Ann. § 4-110-105(d); California, see Cal. Civ. Code § 1798,82(a); Colorado, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6176(2);
Connecticut, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36a-701b(b); Delaware, see Del. Code Ann. Tit 6, 12B-102(a); District of
Columbia, see D.C. Code § 28-3852(a); Georgia, see Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-912(a); Hawaii, see H.R.S. § 487N-2;
Illinois, see 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 530/10(a); Indiana, see Ind. Code § 24-4.9-3-3; Louisiana, see La. Rev. Stat. §
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companies to undertake investigations, companies generally must first conduct a “reasonable and
prompt” investigation to determine the likelihood that personal information has been or will be misused; if
so, they must then provide notice in the most expedient time possible.

124

A. Penalties
Consumers in California,
130

the District of Columbia

125

Hawaii,

126

127

New Hampshire,

North Carolina,

128

Washington

129

and

have an explicit private right of action under their state data breach statutes.

Companies that do not comply with the statute face civil penalties ranging from $500 a violation in
Maine

131

to a maximum of $750,000 in Michigan,

132

and a range of penalties in between.

133

In 26 states

the attorney general may institute suit for actual damages or injunctive relief against organizations or
individuals that violate the data breach statute.

134

51:3074; Massachusetts, Mass Gen. Laws 93H §3; Michigan; see Mich. Comp. Laws. § 445.72(12)(4); Minnesota,
see Minn. Stat. § 325E.61, Subdiv. 1(a); Missouri, H.B. No. 62, 407.1500.2(3); Montana, see Mont. Code Ann. § 3014-1704(1); Nevada, see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 603A.220(1); New Jersey, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-163(12)(a); New
York, see N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law, § 899-aa(2); North Carolina, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-65; North Dakota, see N.D.
Cent. Code § 51-30-02; Oklahoma, 74 Okla. Stat. § 3113(3); Oregon, Or. Rev. Stat.§ 646A.604; Pennsylvania, see
73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2303(a); Rhode Island, see R.I. Gen. Laws, § 11-49.2-3; Tennessee, see Tenn. Code Ann., § 4718-2107(d); Texas, see Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 48.103(b); Utah, see Utah Code Ann. 13-44-202(2); Vermont,
see V.S.A.. Tit. 9 § 2435(b)(1); Washington, see Wash. Rev. Code § 19.255.010(1).
124
The seven states in which states first must conduct a “reasonable and prompt” investigation are Arizon, Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 44-7501; Idaho, Idaho Code §§ 28-51-105; Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 70-7102; Maine, 10 Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 1348; Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-803(1); New Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-C:20 I(a);
Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 40-12-501(a).
125
126
127
128
129
130

131
132

See Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.84.
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.84.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-C:21.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-65-(i).
Wash. Rev. Code. § 19.255(10)(a).
D.C. Code § 28-3853(a).
10 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1349.2.
Mich. Comp. Laws. § 445.72(13)-(14).

133

In Arizona, companies face civil penalties up to $10,000, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-7501(H); in Hawaii, civil
penalties up to $2,500 for each violation, see H.R.S.§ 487N -3; Idaho, fines of up to $25,000 per breach, see Idaho
Code § 28-51-107; Indiana, civil penalties up to $150,000 per deceptive act; see Ind. Code § 24-4.9-4-2.
134
The 26 jurisdictions in which state Attorneys General have authority to bring suits for damages or injunctive
relief are Alaska, Alaska Code §45.48.080(a), Arkansas, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-109-108; Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat.
Stat. § 6176(4); Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. 36a-701b(g); Delaware, Del. Code Ann. Tit. 6, § 12B-106; Illinois, 815
ILCS 530/20; Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-7a02(g); Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3075; Maine, Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann., Tit. 10 § 1349.2; Iowa, Iowa Code § 715C.2(8); Maryland, Md. Code; Ann. § 14-3508; Massachusetts, Mass.
Gen. Laws. Ch. 93H, § 6; Minnesota, Minn. Stat. § Subdiv. 6; Missouri, Mo. H.B. No. 62, § 407.1500.4; Nebraska,
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-806; Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 603A.920; New Jersey, C.56:8-166; North Carolina, N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 75-65(i); North Dakota, N.D. Cent. Code § 51-03-07; Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.19(I); Oklahoma, 74
Okla. Stat. § 3113.3 Pennsylvania, 73 Pa. Stat. Annot. 2309; Tennessee, Tenn. Code An., 47-18-2106; Texas, Tex.
Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 48.201; Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 14-44-301(4); Vermont, V.S.A § 2435(g), Virginia, 18.2186.6; West Virginia, W. Va. Code § 46A-2A-104; Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-12-502(f).
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B. Enforcement and Litigation Under the Data Breach Statutes
In the first five years after the first data breach statute was passed in California in 2002, there
were relatively few state or federal complaints filed under the data breach notification statutes, especially
in light of the number of data breaches reported. The early suits arising out of the data breaches were
focused on contract or tort rather than violation of the data breach notification statutes themselves. For
example, the Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General led a multi-state investigation into the security
breach reported by the TJX Companies, the parent company of TJ Maxx, Marshalls, HomeGoods, and
A.J. Wright stores. The FTC filed suit as well, alleging that TJX failed to prevent unauthorized access to
personal information on its computer networks and that these failures allowed a hacker to exploit
vulnerabilities and obtain tens of millions of credit and debit payment cards used at the retailer’s stores,
as well as personal information relating to approximately 455,000 consumers who returned merchandise
without receipts.

135

The TJX breach affected information regarding credit and debit card sales

transactions in TJX’s stores in the United States, Canada and Puerto Rico during 2003, as well as such
information for these stores from mid-May through December 2006.

136

individual and class action suits filed by consumers across the country.

TJX also faced numerous
137

Both the private litigation and

the public enforcement actions were focused on claims arising under TJX’s failure to protect consumers’
personally identifiable information; there were no claims that the company had failed to notify the victims
upon the discovery of the breach.

In June 2009 TJX settled with the multi-state group of attorneys general and agreed to pay $9.75
million to the states, $5.5 million of which is to be dedicated to data protection and consumer protection

135

http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723055/080801tjxcomplaint.pdf

136

http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=pressreleases&agId=Cago&prModName=cagopressrelease&prFile=2007_02_07_tjx_i
nvestigation.xml
137
The actions filed against TJX, the parent company of TJ Maxx, include Robinson v. TJX Companies, Inc., et
al., 07-cv-02139 (N.D. Ill.); Arians, et al. v. TJX Companies, Inc., et al., 07-cv-10769 (D. Mass.); Massachusetts
Bankers Ass’n, et al. v. TJX Companies, Inc., et al., 07-cv-10791 (D. Mass.); Wardrop v. TJX Companies, Inc., et al.,
07-cv-00430 (W.D. Mich); Taliaferro, et al. v. TJX Companies, Inc., et al., 07-cv-00388 (S.D. Ohio); Lack, et al. v. TJX
Companies, Inc., et al., 07-cv-00233 (E.D. Tex.); Lamb, et al. v. TJX Companies, Inc., et al., 07-cv-00379 (W.D. Mo.);
Roberts, et al. v. TJX Companies, Inc., et al., 07-cv-02887 (N.D. Ill.); and Mace v. TJX Companies, Inc., et al., (D.
Mass.), which has been administratively designated as the lead case with respect to all actions pending in the District
of Massachusetts, which have been consolidated.
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efforts by the states and $1.75 million is for reimbursement of the states' costs and fees. The remaining
$2.5 million of the settlement will fund a Data Security Trust that will be used by the state attorneys
general for policy efforts in the field of data security and protecting consumers' personal information.

138

The company's settlement with the FTC requires that it establish and maintain a comprehensive security
program reasonably designed to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information
139

it collects from or about consumers.

To settle the class action suits, TJX offered vouchers, cash, credit
140

monitoring, identity theft insurance, and reimbursement to eligible class members.

However, starting in 2008 a number of recent large breaches have spawned suits under data
breach statutes in federal courts around the country as well as an increasing number of actions by state
attorneys general. The data breach at Countrywide Financial, the holding company for Countrywide
Home Loans, has thus far given rise to six class actions filed in federal district courts across the country.
One of the six was filed in the Southern District of Florida and alleges a violation of the Florida data
breach notification statute.

141

The United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the

six cases and transferred them to the Western District of Kentucky for pretrial proceedings.

142

In addition,

the Connecticut Attorney General announced in September 2008 that as part of its ongoing investigation
it was seeking more details about the threat to Connecticut consumers, confirmation that the company
would provide free credit monitoring and freezes, and a guarantee that consumers would be
compensated for losses associated with the breach.

143

In 2007 the New York Attorney General's Office announced a settlement with CS Stars LLC, a
Chicago-based claims management company for failing to notify 540,000 New York consumers for seven
weeks after a breach in 2006 in contravention of the statute's requirement that notice be made
“immediately following discovery.” The company agreed to comply with the law, ensure that proper
138
139
140

http://www.nmag.gov/Articles/newsArticle.aspx?ArticleID=718#FullArticle

http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723055/080327agreement.pdf
http://www.tjxsettlement.com/

141

Goldman v. Countrywide Financial Corp., et al., 2008 WL 4236995, (S.D.Fla. Aug 22, 2008), Class Action
Complaint with Injunctive Relief Sought and Demand for Jury Trial (NO. 08-61349).
142
In Re Countrywide Financial Corp. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, MDL No. 1998 (Dec. 2, 2008).
143

http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2795&Q=422688
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notifications be made in the event of the future, implement more extensive practices relating to the
security of private information and pay the Attorney General's office $60,000 for costs related to the
investigation.

144

In the wake of the Heartland Payment Systems breach of 2009, plaintiffs seeking class action
status have filed suit alleging contract violations as well as failure to promptly notify consumers of the
data breach in violation of New Jersey law.

145

The plaintiffs in the Express Scripts class action cited 11

data breach notification statutes, noting that Missouri, the home of the St. Louis-based pharmacy benefit
management company that suffered the breach did not then have such a requirement.

146

RBS WorldPay also has to contend with a federal district court action filed in the northern District
of Georgia seeking class action status and alleging a violation of Georgia’s data breach notification
statute.

147

In addition, Wackenhut Corporation, the security company, is contending with a suit filed in

2008 in Tennessee Circuit Court alleging that it failed to notify consumers of a data breach as required by
state law.

148

The Indiana Attorney General's Office recently resolved suits brought with the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services' Office of Civil Rights against two pharmacy chains, CVS
150

Walgreens,

149

and

that involved data breach complaints alleging that customers' medical information was

improperly discarded in trash bins outside of the stores. The actions, however, were brought under
HIPAA, not the Indiana data breach notification statute.

144

http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2007/apr/apr26a_07.html

145

Sansom v. Heartland Payment Systems, Inc., 2009 WL 217497, *217497+ (Trial Pleading) (D.N.J. Jan 23,
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The rise of complaints alleging violations of data breach notification statutes – both by state
attorneys general and by private litigants in federal court – should be a wake up call for lawyers and their
clients. As the incidence of reported data breaches increases, along with the number of complaints that
companies have failed to comply with the requirements under the statute, liability – in terms of penalties
and judgments -- will rise as well. Statutes in 24 states incorporate provisions that allow companies to
take “any measures necessary to determine the presence, nature, and scope of the breach and restore
the reasonable integrity of the system;”

151

any time limits are tolled while the company is under taking

such an investigation. Seven states also require companies to undertake a “reasonable” investigation to
undertake the scope of the breach.

152

Accordingly, when companies face a data breach—and the

prospect of litigation—it would be in their best interest to consider the stakes at risk and how they will
approach such an investigation.

V. Recommendations: Toward a Federal Data Breach Notification Standard
A. Data Breach Notification Statute for HIPAA-Covered Entities

The 2009 economic stimulus legislation includes requirements that “covered entities” as defined
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) provide notices to consumers of
any breaches in the security of their protected health information (PHI). “Business associates” of HIPAAcovered entities will also be required to report such breaches to covered entities.

153

Congress uses a hybrid approach in its notification requirement, defining “breach” as "the
unauthorized acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of protected health information which compromises
the security or privacy of such information, except where an unauthorized person to whom such
information is disclosed would not reasonably have been able to retain such information." §13400(1)(A).
There is an another exception for certain circumstances involving inadvertent acquisition, access, or use
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See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section III.B.
th
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H.R. 1 (111 Cong., 1 Sess., Feb. 17, 2009) at §13402(a) & (b).
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of PHI by employees and agents of covered entities or business associates where the information is not
further acquired, accessed, used, or disclosed.

154

The notification of breach provisions apply to PHI that is "unsecured." The legislation leaves the
definition of “unsecured” to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to address within 180 days of
the statute’s passage in February 2009, that is by August 2009. The provisional standard included by the
statute, however, defines “unsecured” information as:
[p]rotected health information that is not secured by a technology standard that renders protected
health information unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized individuals and is
developed or endorsed by a standards developing organization that is accredited by the
155
American National Standards Institute.
Congress’ enactment of a federal data breach notification requirement for PHI is an important first
step toward a rationalization of data security standards. Congress should now take the next step and
enact a statute that applies to consumers’ PII, as defined by California’s statute, and incorporating a risk
assessment approach to data breach notifications rather than strict liability. The hair trigger set in the
strict liability models has caused so many disclosure letters to be sent to so many consumers—with
consumers often receiving letters from multiple companies regarding the same breach—that people have
156

become numb to the effect.

The form letters generally provide consumers with no information about

any genuine injury or risk nor do they provide the consumers with the ability to judge whether there is any
likelihood of injury or risk.

Instead, Congress should enact a statute that provides that notification is not required if, after an
appropriate investigation, and after consultation with relevant federal, state, or local agencies responsible
for law enforcement, the company determines that there is no reasonable likelihood of financial harm to
the consumers whose personal information has been acquired as a result of the breach. The company
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H.R. 1 (111 Cong., 1 Sess., Feb. 17, 2009) at §13402(a) & (b).§13400(1)(B)
H.R. 1 (111 Cong., 1 Sess., Feb. 17, 2009) at §13402(h)(1)(B).
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See Schwartz and Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 913 Mich. L. Rev. 916 (2007) (arguing
for determination of data security breaches and post-notification remediation by an independent third party).
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should be required to document the results of its investigation and retain those records for at least five
years, with a fine of $50,000 for failure to maintain those records.

B. Waiting for Godot:
Companies

157

Steps for State Legislatures, Enforcement Agencies, and

An overarching federal data breach notification standard may not happen soon. In the meantime,
there are a number of steps that state and local legislatures and enforcement agencies can take. First,
the five states that do not have data breach notification statutes—Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, New
Mexico, and South Dakota—should enact them immediately. As laid out above, the most efficient,
consumer-oriented approach is a statute that encompasses a risk-assessment definition of “data breach.”

Second, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors should determine if the statutes in their
jurisdictions have “reasonable investigation” and cooperation provisions that toll notification to consumers.
If so, these agencies should ensure that companies are aware of these provisions and work toward taking
full advantage of the ability to find out about breaches as early as possible.

Third, data breach statutes throughout the country present a web of conflicting obligations for
companies and their lawyers that may potentially expose organizations to millions of dollars in fines and
civil liability if obligations under the laws are ignored or misunderstood. A unified data breach notification
statute – either a model state law or a federal statute – will minimize the burden on the private sector.
Companies with a multi-state or Internet presence currently must adhere to the most restrictive law or
wrestle with conflict between the jurisdictions where it does business. Many, if not most, of the state
statutes allow companies to forego notifying individuals whose personal information may have been
compromised if the company “reasonably” determines that the breach did not and likely will not result in
harm to those individuals. Although the statutes do not provide detail on what steps satisfy the
requirements for a “reasonable” investigation,” most do require the companies to document what steps
they have taken and to maintain the records for a set period of time. Companies that undertake a
“reasonable investigation” face extraordinarily high stakes in terms of potential fines and risk to reputation
157

Samuel Beckett (1956).
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and should consider whether to rely on untrained personnel or individuals with potential conflicts of
interest to investigate the origin, nature, and extent of the breach, and to provide a determination as to
whether the breach resulted in harm to individuals whose personal information has been compromised.

Enactment of a federal data breach notification statute can provide enforcement authority to state
attorneys general and a federal law enforcement authority, such as the U.S. Department of Justice or the
Federal Trade Commission. This model has worked well with the Telemarketing Sales Rule

158

and the

159

rule regulating the “pay-per-call” industry

, which provide such authority to both the federal government

and the states, which typically have the most experience combating such problems. Ultimately, the
private sector and consumers will benefit from a unified data breach notification law as well as multiple
enforcers of that law.
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16 C.F.R. § 310.7.
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